turies. Most recently, Dennett (1987) has focused on how organisms naturally adopt an "intentional stance" and inter-One of the fundamental social skills for humans is a theory pret the behaviors of others as if they possess goals, intents, of other minds. This set of skills allows us to attribute be-anbeif.Ehlgssavasoocednteisusf liefs, goals, and desires to other individuals. To take part in and beliefs. Ethologists have also focused on the issues of normal human social dynamics, a robot must not only know theory of mind. Studies of the social skills present in priabout the properties of objects, but also the properties of ani-mates and other mammals have revolved around the extent to mate agents in the world. This paper presents the theories of which other species are able to interpret the behavior of con-Leslie (1994) and Baron-Cohen (1995) on the development specifics and influence that behavior through deception (e.g. of theory of mind in human children and discusses the po-Premack (1988), Povinelli and Preuss (1995) , and Cheney tential application of both of these theories to building robots and Seyfarth (1991)). Research on the development of social with similar capabilities. Initial implementation details and skills in children have focused on characterizing the develbasic skills (such as finding faces and eyes and distinguishing opmental progression of social abilities (e.g. Fodor (1992), animate from inanimate stimuli) are introduced. We further Wimmer and Pemer (1983), and Frith and Frith (1999)) and speculate on the usefulness of a robotic implementation in evaluating and comparing these two models, on how these skills result in conceptual changes and the representational capacities of infants (e.g. Carey (1999) and
Introduction velopmental disorders such as autism have focused on the Human social dynamics rely upon the ability to correctly selective impairment of these social skills (e.g. Pemer and attribute beliefs, goals, and percepts to other people. This Lang (1999) , Karmiloff-Smith et. al. (1995) , and Mundy set of metarepresentational abilities, which have been col-and Sigman (1989) ). lectively called a "theory of mind", allows us to understand Researchers studying the development of social skills in the actions and expressions of others within an intentional normal children, the presence of social skills in primates and or goal-directed framework (what Dennett (1987) has called other vertebrates, and certain pervasive developmental disorthe intentional stance). The recognition that other individ-ders have all focused on attempting to decompose the idea uals have knowledge, perceptions, and intentions that differ of a central "theory of mind" into sets of precursor skills from our own is a critical step in a child's development and and developmental modules. In this abstract, I will attempt is believed to be instrumental in self-recognition, grounding to review two of the most popular and influential general in linguistic acquisition, and possibly in the development models which attempt to link together multi-disciplinary reof imaginative and creative play (Byrne & Whiten 1988) .
search into a coherent developmental explanation, one from These abilities are also central to what defines human inter- Baron-Cohen (1995) and one from Leslie (1994) . I will then actions. Normal social interactions depend upon the recog-describe the initial phases of a research program aimed at nition of other points of view, the understanding of other implementing many of these precursor skills on a humanoid mental states, and the recognition of complex non-verbal robot. signals of attention and emotional state.
Research from many different disciplines have focused Leslie's model of theory of mind on theory of mind. Students of philosophy have been in-Leslie's (1984) theory treats the representation of causal terested in the understanding of other minds and the rep-events as a central organizing principle to theories of obresentation of knowledge in others for the past two cen-ject mechanics and theories of other minds much in the same way that the notion of number may be central to ob- specific modules to deal with each of these classes of event.
The first module interprets self-propelled motion of stim-The Theory of Body module (ToBY) deals with events that uli in terms of the primitive volitional mental states of goal are best described by mechanical agency, that is, they can be and desire. This module, called the intentionality detector explained by the rules of mechanics. The second module is (ID) produces dyadic representations that describe the basystem 1 of the Theory of Mind module (ToMM-1) which sic movements of approach and avoidance. For example, ID explains events in terms of the intent and goals of agents, can produce representations such as "he wants the food" or that is, their actions. The third module is system 2 of the "she wants to go over there". This module only operates on Theory of Mind module (ToMM-2) which explains events stimuli that have self-propelled motion, and thus pass a criin terms of the attitudes and beliefs of agents.
teria for distinguishing stimuli that are potentially animate The first mechanism is the Theory of Body mechanism (agents) from those that are not (objects). Baron-Cohen (ToBY) which embodies the infant's understanding of physspeculates that ID is a part of the innate endowment that ical objects. ToBY is a domain-specific module that deals infants are born with. with the understanding of physical causality in a mechanical
The second module processes visual stimuli that are eyesense. ToBY's goal is to describe the world in terms of the like to determine the direction of gaze. This module, called mechanics of physical objects and the events they enter into.
the eye direction detector (EDD), has three basic functions. ToBY is believe to operate on two types of visual input: a First, it detects the presence of eye-like stimuli in the visual three-dimensional object-centered representation from high field. Human infants have a preference to look at human level cognitive and visual systems and a simpler motion-faces, and spend more time gazing at the eyes than at other based system. This second system accounts for the causal parts of the face. Second, EDD computes whether the eyes explanations that adults give (and the causal expectations of are looking at it or at something else. Baron-Cohen prochildren) to the "billiard ball" type launching displays pio-poses that having someone else make eye contact is a natural neered by Michotte (1962) . Leslie proposed that this mecha-psychological releaser that produces pleasure in infants (but nism is innate, but more recent work from Cohen and Amsel may produce more negative arousal in other animals). Third, (1998) may show that it develops extremely rapidly in the EDD interprets gaze direction as a perceptual state, that is, first few months and is fully developed by 6.5 months.
EDD codes dyadic representational states of the form "agent ToBy is followed developmentally by the emergence of a sees me" and "agent looking-at not-me." Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM) which develops in two
The third module, the shared attention mechanism phases, which Leslie calls system-1 and system-2 but which (SAM), takes the dyadic representations from ID and EDD we will refer to as ToMM-1 and ToMM-2 after Baron-Cohen and produces triadic representations of the form "John sees (1995) . Just as ToBY deals with the physical laws that gov-(I see the girl)." Embedded within this representation is a em objects, ToMM deals with the psychological laws that specification that the external agent and the self are both atgovern agents. ToMM-1 is concerned with actional agency; tending to the same perceptual object or event. This shared it deals with agents and the goal-directed actions that they attentional state results from an embedding of one dyadic produce. This system of detecting goals and actions begins representation within another. SAM additionally can make to emerge at around 6 months of age, and is most often char-the output of ID available to EDD, allowing the interpretaacterized by attention to eye gaze. Leslie leaves open the tion of eye direction as a goal state. By allowing the agent issue of whether ToMM-1 is innate or acquired. ToMM-2 to interpret the gaze of others as intentions, SAM provides is concerned with attitudinal agency; it deals with the rep-a mechanism for creating nested representations of the form resentations of beliefs and how mental states can drive be-"John sees (I want the toy)." havior relative to a goal. This system develops gradually,
The last module, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM), with the first signs of development beginning between 18 provides a way of representing epistemic mental states in and 24 months of age and completing sometime near 48 other agents and a mechanism for tying together our knowlmonths. ToMM-2 employs the M-representation, a metarep-edge of mental states into a coherent whole as a usable theresentation which allows the truth properties of a statement ory. ToMM first allows the construction of representations to be based on mental states rather than observable stimuli, of the form "John believes (it is raining)." ToMM allows the ToMM-2 is a required system for understanding that oth-suspension of the normal truth relations of propositions (refers hold beliefs that differ from our own knowledge or from erential opacity), which provides a means for representing the observable world, for understanding different perceptual knowledge states that are neither necessarily true nor match perspectives, and for understanding pretense and pretending.
the knowledge of the organism, such as "John thinks (Elvis is alive)." Baron-Cohen proposes that the triadic represen-Baron-Cohen's model of theory of mind tations of SAM are converted through experience into the Baron-Cohen's model assumes two forms of perceptual in-M-representations of ToMM. formation are available as input. The first percept describes For normal children, Baron-Cohen proposes that both ID all stimuli in the visual, auditory, and tactile perceptual and the basic functions of EDD are available to infants in spheres that have self-propelled motion. The second per-the first 9 months of life. SAM develops between 9 and 18 cept describes all visual stimuli that have eye-like shapes. months, and ToMM develops from 18 months to 48 months. Baron-Cohen proposes that the set of precursors to a theory One of the most attractive parts of this model though is the of mind, which he calls the "mindreading system," can be ways in which it has been applied both to the abnormal dedecomposed into four distinct modules. velopment of social skills in autism and the ways that the de-composition has been compared to the social skills of other for further processing to occur specifically on each type of primates and vertebrates, stimulus. Baron-Cohen does not divide the perceptual world Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder of unknown quite so cleanly, but does provide more detail on limiting etiology that is diagnosed by a checklist of behavioral crite-the specific perceptual inputs that each module requires. In ria. Baron-Cohen has proposed that the range of deficiencies practice, both models require remarkably similar perceptual in autism can be characterized by his model. In all cases, systems (which is not surprising, since the behavioral data is EDD and ID are present. In some cases of autism, SAM not under debate). However, each perspective is useful in its and ToMM are impaired, while in others only ToMM is im-own way in building a robotic implementation. At one level, paired. This can be contrasted with other developmental the robot must distinguish between object stimuli that are to disorders (such as Down's syndrome) or specific linguistic be interpreted according to physical laws and agent stimuli disorder in which evidence of all four modules can be seen. that are to be interpreted according to psychological laws. Furthermore, Baron-Cohen attempts to provide an evo-However, the specifications that Baron-Cohen provides will lutionary description of these modules by identifying partial be necessary for building visual routines that have limited abilities in other primates and vertebrates. This phylogenetic scope. description ranges from the abilities of hog-nosed snakes to
The implementation of the higher-level scope of each of detect direct eye contact to the sensitivities of chimpanzees these models also has implications to robotics. Leslie's to intentional acts. Roughly speaking, the abilities of EDD model has a very elegant decomposition into three distinct seem to be the most basic and can be found in part in snakes, areas of influence, but the interactions between these levavians, and most other vertebrates as a sensitivity to preda-els are not well specified. Connections between modules tors (or prey) looking at the animal. ID seems to be present in Baron-Cohen's model are better specified, but they are in many primates, but the capabilities of SAM seem to be still less than ideal for a robotics implementation. Issues present only partially in the great apes. The evidence on on how stimuli are to be divided between the competencies ToMM is less clear, but it appears that no other primates of different modules must be resolved for both models. On readily infer mental states of belief and knowledge.
the positive side, the representations that are constructed by components in both models are well specified.
Implementing a theory of mind for a robot A robotic system that possessed a theory of mind would al-
Components of a Robotic Theory of Mind low for social interactions between the robot and humans
Taking both Baron-Cohen's model and Leslie's model, we that have previously not been possible. The robot would can begin to specify the perceptual and cognitive abilities be capable of learning from an observer using normal social that our robots must employ. Our initial systems concentrate signals in the same way that human infants learn; no special-on two abilities: distinguishing between animate and inanized training of the observer would be necessary. The robot imate motion and on identifying gaze direction. To mainwould also be capable of expressing its internal state (emo-tain engineering constraints, we must focus on systems that tions, desires, goals, etc.) through social interactions with-can be performed with limited computational resources, at out relying upon an artificial vocabulary. Further, a robot interactive rates in real time, and on noisy and incomplete that can recognize the goals and desires of others will allow data. To maintain biological plausibility, we focus on buildfor systems that can more accurately react to the emotional, ing systems that match the available data on infant percepattentional, and cognitive states of the observer, can learn to tual abilities. anticipate the reactions of the observer, and can modify its
We have constructed an upper-torso humanoid robot with own behavior accordingly. The construction of these sys-a pair of six degree-of-freedom arms, a three degree-oftems may also provide a new tool for investigating the pre-freedom torso, and a seven degree of freedom head and neck. dictive power and validity of the models from natural sys-The robot, named Cog, has a visual system consisting of four tems that serve as the basis. An implemented model can be color CCD cameras (two cameras per eye, one with a wide tested in ways that are not possible to test on humans, using field of view and one with a narrow field of view at higher alternate developmental conditions, alternate experiences, acuity), an auditory system consisting of two microphones, a and alternate educational and intervention approaches.
vestibular system consisting of a three axis inertial package, The difficulty, of course, is that even the initial compo-and an assortment of kinesthetic sensing from potentiomenents of these models require the coordination of a large ters, strain gauges, and thermistors. number of perceptual, sensory-motor, attentional, and cog-
We are currently implementing a system that distinnitive processes. In this section, I will outline the advantages guishes between animate and inanimate visual stimuli based and disadvantages of Leslie's model and Baron-Cohen's on the presence of self-generated motion. Similar to the model with respect to implementation. In the following sec-findings of Leslie (1982) and Cohen and Amsel (1998) on tion, I will describe some of the components that have al-the classification performed by infants, our system operates ready been constructed and some which are currently de-at two developmental stages. Both stages form trajectosigned but still being implemented.
ries from stimuli in consecutive image frames and attempt From a robotics standpoint, the most salient differences to maximize the path coherency. This computational techbetween the two models are in the ways in which they di-nique for multi-target tracking has been used extensively in vide perceptual tasks. Leslie cleanly divides the percep-signal processing domains, and our approach is most similar tual world into animate and inanimate spheres, and allows to the algorithm proposed by Reid (1979) and implemented by Cox and Hingorani (1996) . We are currently develop-joint visual attention. In Whiten, A., ed., Natural Theories ing metrics for evaluating these trajectories in order to clas-of Mind. Blackwell. sify the stimulus as either animate or inanimate using the de-Byrne, R., and Whiten, A., eds. 1988 (2):138-150. by Sinha (1996) . Once a potential face location has been identified, the robot saccades to that target using a learned Dennett, D. als with Williams Syndrome. Journal of Cognitive Neu-In addition to these obvious behaviors, there are also a roscience 7:2:196-208. variety of behavioral and cognitive skills that are not inte-Leslie, A. M. 1982. The perception of causality in infants. gral parts of the theory of mind models, but are nonethe-Perception 11:173-186. less necessary to implement the desired functionality. We have implemented a variety of perceptual feature detectors Leslie, A.M. 1984. Spatiotemporal continuity and the (such as color saliency detectors, motion detectors, skin perception of causality in infants. Perception 13:287-305. color filters, and rough disparity detectors) that match the Leslie, A. M. 1994. ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core arperceptual abilities of young infants. We have constructed chitecture and domain specificity. In Hirschfeld, L. A., and a model of human visual search and attention that was pro-Gelman, S. A., eds., Mapping the Mind: Domain speciposed by Wolfe (1994) . We have also implemented motor ficity in cognition and culture. Cambridge University Press. control schemes for visual motor behaviors (including sac-119-148. cades, smooth-pursuit tracking, and a vestibular-occular re-Michotte, A. 1962. The perception of causality. Andover, flex), orientation movements of the head and neck, and prim-MA: Methuen. itive reaching movements for a six degree-of-freedom arm.
Mundy, P., and Sigman, M. 1989. The theoretical implica-At this workshop, I will present the implementation of tions of joint attention deficits in autism. Development and these basic social skills and discuss the usefulness of mod-Psychopathology 1:173-183. els of theory of mind from Baron-Cohen and Leslie in implementing robotic systems.
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